Recent banking theory holds that durable firm-bank relationships are valuable to both parties. This paper uses the contract-specific loan records of a 19th-century U.S. bank and shows that firms with extended relationships received three principal benefits. First, firms with extended relationships had lower credit costs. Second, long-term customers provided fewer personal guarantees, which were an alternative to collateral. Third, long-term customers were more likely to have loan terms renegotiated during a credit crunch. These findings support theories that banks realize cost advantages through the use of proprietary information.
for nine years and that a majority identify a commercial bank as their primary financial intermediary. Theory holds that small businesses that form relationships with a principal bank secure several advantages, including lower interest costs, greater credit availability, lower collateral demands, and protection against credit rationing in periods of firm distress. Yet, despite a general sentiment that firm-bank relationships are valuable, empirical evidence on the subject remains inconclusive.
This paper uses a unique contract-specific data set drawn from the surviving records of a 19th-century bank to analyze the value of firm-bank relationships. The Black River Bank of Watertown, New York, was a free bank operating under New York's Free Banking Act of 1838. This bank's records provide information on every loan made between 1845 and 1861 and data were collected for all loans in 1855 and 1857-1858, including the name and account number of the borrowing firm, the loan amount, the interest rate, the loan term, the number of consigners, the purpose of the loan, and whether the loan was renegotiated and renewed at maturity. Each borrower in 1855 and 1857-1858 was matched to the bank's loan records between 1845 and 1854 (1856) to determine the length and intensity of the relationship. The 1855 sample is then used to investigate how intensive bank-borrower relations influenced loan rates and third-party guarantees at the end of a decade-long economic expansion. The 1857-1858 sample is used to investigate how long-term relationships influenced a bank's willingness to renegotiate with borrowers during a financial crisis.
The data set offers several advantages over widely used survey data. First, as noted by Blackwell and Winters (1997) and Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) , focusing on a narrow set of lenders controls better for unobserved heterogeneity in bank lending standards and, therefore, borrower attributes. Second, most previous research measures the strength of firm-bank relationships using relationship duration, scope (the provision of complementary financial services), or exclusivity (whether the current bank is a main bank) instead of relationship intensity (the number of loans). One explanation for equivocal results in the existing literature is that extended, extensive, or exclusive relationships are not necessarily strong relationships. Some firms may rely on a single lender over a long period but borrow infrequently. Infrequent interaction, even if exclusive, is not the type of regular contracting envisioned in the theoretical literature (see Boot 2000) . Effective monitoring and screening likely requires repeat contracting at brief and regular intervals. Through regular contracting, bankers realize cost economies because information is reused while it is fresh. This data set differentiates between long-term relationships and frequent recontracting. We show that, in some regards, frequency is as important as duration.
Third, despite the presence of a reasonably active commercial paper market in New York City and other port cities, small business finance in early America was bank-based. Only large, well-known mercantile houses borrowed in commercial paper markets. Most borrowers relied on banks or private capitalists for working capital (Greef 1938) . Bond and equity markets were restricted to the few existing corporations, mostly banks, insurance companies, canals, and railroads. Thus, early American financial markets provide a unique opportunity to investigate the importance of relationships in a bank-based environment.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the data are available over a period that includes a financial crisis-the panic of 1857. This provides a unique opportunity to test the so-called credit-channel hypothesis (Bernanke, 1983, Bernanke and Blinder, 1988) , which implies that monetary shocks have disproportionate effects on small, bank-dependent borrowers. Ongena, Smith, and Michalsen (1999) investigate the results of bank distress on borrowing firms during the Norwegian bank crisis of 1988-1991. They find no support for the hypothesis that bank-dependent firms suffer more during a credit crunch than nondependent firms. Their results, however, may be driven by the public's anticipation of a governmental bailout of the banking sector, which would have preserved banking relationships. This data set employs direct relationship measures and tests their effects on a bank's willingness to recontract during a financial crisis when there is neither implicit nor explicit bailout guarantees. The results show that extended relationships are, indeed, valuable.
THEORETICAL ISSUES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The information approach to financial intermediation argues that intermediaries exist because they mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard problems that naturally arise in financing uncertain entrepreneurial projects. Intermediaries, particularly banks, capture economies of scale or exploit other comparative advantages in the production of information about borrowers (Freixas and Rochet 1997 provide a survey), which makes it more economic for small firms to borrow from banks than in markets.
An important branch of the information approach is the emphasis placed on firm-bank relationships. Though different in approach, Diamond (1991) and Boot and Thakor (1994) develop models in which good borrowers reveal themselves, generate track records, and see their interest rates and collateral demands decline. Both approaches emphasize the benefits of developing extended firm-bank relationships. Boot (2000) outlines five potential benefits. First, lending relationships facilitate information reuse through time, which encourages information production and monitoring by lenders. Second, relationships facilitate flexible, implicit long-term contracting. Third, loan contracts typically include covenants to mitigate agency costs that become suboptimal as new information arrives. Depending on relative bargaining strengths, the development of long-term relationships facilitates low-cost renegotiation of covenants. Fourth, relationship lending often involves collateral or personal guarantees, and long-term contractual relationships encourage monitoring and the efficient use of costly collateral. Fifth, relationship lending accommodates the intertemporal smoothing of loan terms, which benefits young, informationally opaque firms.
The two principal costs of relationship lending are the soft budget constraint problem and the informational capture problem. Soft budget constraint problems arise when the borrowing firm becomes distressed. Distressed firms often approach lenders, seeking additional finance to avoid or postpone default. Knowing that banks face incentives to support the firm in order to recoup the original loan, borrowers face perverse incentives to take inefficient risks or exert insufficient effort. A second cost of relationship lending is that banks gain informational advantages over borrowing firms, and long-term dealings allow banks greater opportunities to exploit their advantage. Switching costs generate quasi-rents that current lenders appropriate. Further, banks in more concentrated markets are better positioned to capture quasirents by virtue of their market power.
Market power may benefit some borrowers, however. Sharpe's (1990) informationcapture model shows that firms pay below-market loan rates early in the relationship (presumably when credit rationing for young firms without reputations is most severe) and then compensate the bank by paying above-market rates later in the relationship. If banks and borrowers can offer credible time-consistent commitments, it is optimal to offer the first-time borrower relatively low interest rates to avoid the adverse selection problem and recoup this early-period subsidization by charging supra-competitive rates later (Rajan 1998) .
While the interest rate effects of efficient information production and potential problems of market power are among the central themes of research on relationship banking, extant empirical evidence is conflicting. Using data compiled by the National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF), Petersen and Rajan (1994) investigate credit costs and loan availability to more than 3000 small businesses. They find no correlation between the duration of bank-borrower relationships and the cost of credit, but they find a strong positive relationship between credit availability and relationship duration. Berger and Udell (1995) argue that Petersen and Rajan's failure to find a negative correlation between credit costs and duration results from the inclusion of transaction loans in the analysis. By focusing their analysis on lines of credit (L/Cs), a type of lending more consistent with relationship banking, Berger and Udell find that credit costs and collateral use are declining in relationship duration. However, Cole (1998) uses a later NSSBF sample and concludes, like Petersen and Rajan, that relationship duration is a more important determinant of credit availability than is credit cost.
Using contract-specific data from two bank holding companies, Blackwell and Winters (1997) find no statistical relationship between relationship duration and credit costs. Similarly, Elsas and Krahnen (1998) , using contract-specific data from five German banks, fail to find any significant interest-cost advantage on lines of credit involving long-term bank relationships. Survey data on small firm L/Cs in Germany also fail to reveal any significant correlation between relationship duration and credit costs (Harhoff and Körting 1998) .
Two studies find evidence broadly consistent with the information-capture hypothesis. Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) gathered information on about 18,000 loans extended by a single Belgian bank to mostly small businesses. They find offsetting relationship effects. On one hand, the loan rate increases with the length of the relationship. On the other, loan rates decline with the scope of the relationship, defined as the purchase of other information-intensive services from the bank. The scope effect outweighs the duration effect. Angelini, Di Salvo, and Ferri (1998) find that at Italian banks other than credit cooperatives, loan rates tend to increase with the length of relationship. The same effect is seen for nonmember borrowers at credit cooperatives. Among cooperative members, long-term relationships have no discernible effect on credit costs.
Thus empirical studies have found conflicting interest rate effects. If extended relationships generate benefits, how then might these benefits manifest themselves? One may be the availability of credit rather than its price. With the exception of Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) , all the above-cited empirical studies find a positive correlation between relationship duration and credit availability. A second benefit of long-term bank relationships may be a general decline in collateral usage. Barro (1976) , Benjamin (1978) , Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) , Boot and Thakor (1994) , and Rajan and Winton (1995) all contend that collateral reduces postcontractual opportunism. But collateral is a costly contractual device because it necessitates additional contractual stipulations regarding the amount and type of collateral to be provided, the creditor's rights in taking possession in the event of default, and the borrower's control over the collateral during the term of the loan. Moreover, actual repossession and sale of the asset often imposes losses on the creditor as markets for some assets are thin and liquidations involve sizable opportunity costs.
Although collateral may be an important element of many loan contracts, small business finance often involves personal guarantees rather than collateral. Collateral and guarantees are similar but not equivalent devices for dealing with postcontractual opportunism. Like collateral, guarantees allow financial institutions to offer credit on favorable terms to small businesses where informational opaqueness might otherwise result in credit rationing or outright denial. Collateral and guarantees differ, however, in that most loan agreements involving collateral include restrictions on the use to which borrowers may put the collateralized assets and prohibit their disposal without the lender's permission. Personal guarantees, on the other hand, represent a general claim against the total wealth of the guarantors and typically do not restrict the use of that wealth. Guarantees are more valuable than collateral when the personal assets of the guarantors may be more easily valued or sold than highly firm-specific assets, or if the principal asset of the borrowing firm is the human capital of its owners. Nevertheless, guarantees generally represent a weaker pledge than specific collateral because most loan covenants do not restrict guarantors from selling or redeploying their assets, or from pledging them to another lender. Guarantees are useful, however, to the extent that they align the guarantors' and the lender's interests.
Empirical evidence usually finds collateral usage associated with risky borrowers and risky loans (Berger and Udell 1990) . This is contrary to much existing theory, which holds that good borrowers signal their better prospects through their willingness to pledge collateral. Evidence on the effects of relationships on loan collateral is mixed. Harhoff and Körting (1998) find the longer relationships involve less collateral, but Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) find that main banks tend to demand more collateral. They argue that informational capture has both interest rate and collateral consequences. As the relationship progresses, banks become better informed about a firm's collateral and shift more default risk onto the borrower. On the other hand, better information about collateral may reduce the cost of including collateral covenants in the loan contract, which makes collateral usage more efficient. No study of the consequences of relationships on personal guarantee usage exists. The introduction of personal guarantees into the study of bank relationships represents one of the principal contributions of this research.
Existing empirical studies offer broad support for the hypothesis that long-term relationships positively affect credit availability (see Ongena and Smith 2000 for a review). What these studies have failed to do is link relationship effects with credit availability during a period of sharp financial stress. Economists have long posited a transmission mechanism linking financial sector performance to real sector outcomes, a mechanism that becomes manifest in financial crises (Fisher 1933) . Bernanke (1983) and Bernanke and Blinder (1988) argue that panic-induced disintermediation affects real activity by restricting the flow of financial services to borrowers without access to nonbank credit. One empirical prediction arising from this theory is that newer borrowers face tighter credit conditions than those with longer track records when both types of firms face liquidity constraints (Gertler 1988) . With information asymmetries, lenders tend to know more about long-term customers. This plays a crucial role in reinforcing the financial consequences of a panic. Young and small firms rely on bank-intermediated finance because they have not developed publicly observable track records, which denies them access to arm's-length debt markets. With banks experiencing disintermediation and firms experiencing deteriorating balance sheets, lenders are more likely to renegotiate existing loans or extend new ones to long-term customers. Evidence on Japanese main banks (Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein 1990) provides support for this contention. This paper investigates the behavior of one bank during a severe financial crisis and shows that it was, in fact, more willing to recontract with longer-term borrowers.
DATA SOURCE
The data are drawn from the records of the Black River Bank of Watertown, New York. Loveland Paddock founded the bank in the autumn of 1844 under New York's Free Banking Act of 1838. Paddock had extensive prior banking experience. He had been a director in the Jefferson County Bank as early as 1828; a shareholder and director of the Sacket's Harbor Bank in the late 1830s and early 1840s; and a founding director of the Watertown Bank and Loan (1839-1842). Between 1842 and 1844 he divested his holdings in these other banks, renounced his directorships, sold his dry goods business, and opened his own bank. Paddock controlled 90% of the stock in the Black River Bank; the remaining 10% was divided between his two eldest sons, one of whom was the bank's vice president, the other its cashier (Emerson 1898, p. 336) .
Emerging from the depression of the early 1840s, the decade after 1845 was a period of economic expansion. Real GNP in the U.S. increased at an average annual 3.70% (Berry 1978) . Expansion of the regional economy of northern New York mirrored national trends. Although agriculture remained the region's principal employer, Watertown emerged as a transportation hub as well as a manufacturing and commercial center. Encouraged by the opening of two railroads (one connected Watertown to Lake Ontario to the north, the other to Lake Champlain to the east) and a canal (a feeder line for the Erie Canal), wheat production increased by 7.3% between 1850 and 1860. Manufacturing also grew apace. During the 1850s, the nominal value of capital invested in manufacturing increased at an average annual rate of 2.6%. The nominal value of manufacturing output increased at an average annual rate of 3.5% (U.S. Census Office, 1854, 1865).
Watertown also emerged as a regional financial center, and the Black River Bank became a principal player. In February 1845, the Black River Bank had just $28,000 in outstanding loans and about $95,000 in total assets. This made the bank about half the size of the Bank of Watertown and about one-tenth the size of the Jefferson County Bank. Within a decade the bank established itself as one of the region's leading banks, and in December 1855 the Black River Bank had $482,000 in outstanding loans, compared with $563,000 at the Jefferson County Bank and $380,000 at the Watertown Bank and Loan (New York Assembly 1857). The Black River Bank was, by every outward appearance, a typical commercial bank in 1850s New York.
Because the bank's market share and lending volume stabilized by 1855 and because the economy was near the end of a decade-long expansion, contract-specific information was collected on every loan made in 1855 (a year that should approximate equilibrium bank practice). Of the 2674 loans made in 1855, there were 978 distinct borrowers, so that the average customer borrowed 2.7 times. The bank, like most banks of the antebellum period, specialized in short-term lending, with an average loan maturity of just 68.2 days. Just 3.5% of its loans were renewed (renegotiated and extended) at maturity. The mean loan value was $776 (about $15,250 in constant 2000 dollars) and the mean interest rate was 7.05%.
The bank's hand-written loan records included the name of the borrowing firm or individual, the date of the loan, the date the loan matured, the loan amount, whether the loan was a renewal, and the total interest charge. Annualized interest rates on loans were calculated as i ϭ (interest charge/loan amount)*(365/days to maturity). In the mid-19th century, banks extended credit on two types of instruments: promissory notes and bills of exchange. A promissory note was a simple IOU stating the borrowers' names, the date of the loan, the date of maturity, the amount of the loan, and where the note was payable (typically the borrower's place of business or the lending bank). Promissory notes were not collateralized, but commercial law held that the borrower's real and personal estate guaranteed the note. If a borrower's personal wealth was an insufficient pledge to compensate the bank for its expected default costs, the bank asked borrowers to obtain the signatures of one or more cosigners or third-party guarantors, who added their personal guarantee to the borrower's note. If the borrower defaulted, the bank notified all cosigners and instituted proceedings to attach their property. Thus, promissory notes were secured first by the borrower's assets and second by third-party guarantees. The bank's records include the names of all endorsers for each loan, making it possible to determine the number of guarantors demanded of each borrower.
The second principal contractual form of 19th-century bank lending was the bill of exchange. Bills of exchange differed from promissory notes in two regards. First, they were payable at distant locations. A typical bill transaction in 1850s Watertown involved a local wheat merchant discounting a bill at a local bank to finance a shipment of wheat to New York City. Because the sale was completed in New York City, the bill was payable there, typically at a bank where the shipper maintained an account. Thus the local lender faced the costs of drawing on a correspondent bank to repatriate its funds. To compensate the banker for these additional costs, bills paid an "exchange" fee in addition to the interest charge. Loan records do not explicitly record the fee, but fees averaged about one-quarter of 1% in the mid1850s. The second way in which bills differed from notes was that many bills had an attached bill of lading, which detailed the specific goods in transit. These goods represented implicit collateral because, in the event of default, the goods were seized and sold. To protect themselves, banks typically loaned about one-third to one-half the current market value of the goods in transit on bills of exchange, but if this collateral was unsatisfactory, banks asked borrowers to obtain endorsements just as with promissory notes. The loan records of the bank differentiate between bills of exchange and promissory notes in that bills were listed as payable in New York City, Albany, or Boston and listed the names of all endorsers. The bank protected itself from losses on bills with collateral and personal guarantees.
Two relationship measures were constructed from the bank's records. First, the list of all borrowers in 1855 was matched to the bank's extant loan records (which begin in October 1845) to determine the month and year that each firm first borrowed. The interval between the first loan and any loan(s) in 1855 was recorded to the nearest month. Second, the matching also revealed the number of times the firm had borrowed in the previous decade. This measure represents an advance over previous research because most studies use only measures of relationship duration. In constructing a second measure based on relationship intensity, this study captures the effects of more intensive relationships as well as long-lasting ones. Shorter, but more intense, relationships may provide bankers with timely information. It is not possible to control for relationship scope because the deposit records of the bank are lost. Table 1 reports summary statistics for the relevant variables used in the empirical analysis. Bills of exchange are identified by the city where payable (New York, Albany, or Boston) and represent the collateral associated with their use. About 30% of the bank's loans were bills of exchange. The GUARANTEE variable is the number of third-party guarantors, with larger numbers representing greater security for the lender. The QUARTER dummies show that loans were evenly spaced over the year. Most empirical studies of relationship effects regress various determinants of loan rates on a premium of the bank loan rate over a prime rate of similar maturity. In the antebellum era, the analog of the prime rate was the prevailing rate on good bills of exchange (or commercial paper) in New York City. The loan premium is calculated as the difference between the loan rate and the market rate on good bills in the same week the loan was made. Data on the prime rate in New York City were gathered from the New York Tribune.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The empirical analysis tests whether bank relationships influence credit costs, the use of guarantees, and credit availability during a financial panic.
Relationships and Loan Rates
In this section we relate an ex ante measure of loan risk to several control variables in addition to the two relationship measures. The dependent variable is the loan PREMIUM, or the difference between the contract-specific loan rate and the market rate on high-grade commercial paper of similar maturity (60-90 days) expressed in basis points. The risk premium should incorporate ex ante evaluations of loan risk as well as any relevant premium for monitoring costs associated with secured lending, irrespective of whether the security was collateral or personal guarantees.
The independent variables of principal concern are LNTIMES and LNMONTHS. LNTIMES is defined as the natural log of 1 plus the number of times a firm had previously borrowed from the bank. It is included to capture intensive relationships based on regular contracting. In such relationships, the bank should capture scale economies by reusing information produced about the borrower. LNMONTHS is defined as the natural log of 1 plus the number of months over which a firm had maintained a relationship with the bank regardless of the number of times it had borrowed. It is included to capture long-lasting relationships that may or may not have been based on regular contracting. Several instances were found where firms borrowed from the bank over a decade or more, but some loans were separated by up to four years. Such long-term relationships may foster information reuse, but borrowings separated by extended periods may not lead to scale economies in information production and reuse if four-year-old information is stale.
Control variables include a number of variables included to capture the effects of collateral usage. Because bills of exchange carried implicit collateral, the dummy variables NEWYORK, ALBANY, and BOSTON represent the city where bills were made payable and are included separately to capture any unobserved differences in goods shipped (the underlying collateral) to different cities. The variables should also capture any differential costs of dealing in exchange with different cities. LNGUARANTEE equals the log of 1 plus the number of guarantors. Larger values imply more cosigners, and the measure should capture perceived differences in borrower risk. Its inclusion may reveal whether riskier borrowers or borrowers with riskier projects offered greater security. LNSIZE accounts for any exploitable scale economies in lending, that is, whether lower rates were paid on larger loans. Loan size may also be correlated with unobserved credit risks if the bank allowed safer borrowers larger lending limits. LNMATURITY is included to capture nonrisk term premiums priced into longer duration loans. The RENEW dummy variable equals 1 if the loan was renegotiated and extended. Renewed loans may have been riskier in that the project had not generated sufficient funds to repay them in the stipulated time, or they may have been safer in that a firm's project was successful and the loan extended to pursue it farther. Finally, quarterly dummies were included to capture seasonal differences in loan demand. The historiography of early American banking holds that loan demand increased sharply in the fourth and first quarters (particularly October through January) as farm produce was moved to market. Aggregate data suggest that this pressure tended to induce greater price than quantity responses, a feature confirmed by the response of the Black River Bank, which spaced its loans evenly throughout the year.
A potential criticism of the empirical analysis is the lack of firm-level balance sheet information. But accounting standards in the 1850s were loose to nonexistent, and it is unlikely that small firms prepared regular balance sheets, and it is even less likely that any that did made them available to bankers. Even double-entry bookkeeping, while not unknown, was uncommon. Similarly, no industry effects are included. Lending rates, as well as collateral and guarantee usage, reflect industry differences, but such effects were probably small. Of the borrowers who were identified, most were merchants and artisans borrowing working capital to finance goods in process or transit. Any substantial industrial differences are likely captured in differences in loan size, maturity, and place of payment. Table 2 presents the results of five regressions of the loan risk premia on the control and relationship variables. Columns (1) and (2) report OLS parameter estimates. The estimates show that long-term relationships did, in fact, reduce credit costs. The coefficient on LNTIMES in Column (1) is significantly negative and economically meaningful. The coefficient implies that the loan premium (loan rate less prime rate) declined by 10.1 basis points with 10 previous loans [Ϫ4.23*(ln(11) Ϫ ln(1))], or nearly 27% of the average loan premium. The LNMONTHS coefficient in Column (2) is also significantly negative and economically meaningful. Increasing the length of the relationship by 12 months decreases the loan premium by nearly 10 basis points [Ϫ3.89*(ln(13) Ϫ ln(1))], or more than 26% of the average loan premium. Several previous studies find that longer-lived firms tend to pay lower rates, and the LNMONTHS variable may be capturing a firm age, as well as a relationship effect. The LNTIMES variable may or may not be capturing an unobserved age effect because some firms borrowed extensively in relatively short periods. One merchant borrowed at least once each year between 1845 and 1855, but never more (3) includes both LNMONTHS and LNTIMES to determine the independent effect of each variable while controlling for the other. Although both coefficients are negative, neither is statistically significant because parameter estimates are imprecise when independent variables are collinear. While the coefficients are not estimated precisely, they offer some insight into the relative strengths of the intensity and duration effects. Holding the number of previous loans constant, a relationship extending an additional 12 months lowers the estimated loan premium by 6.7 basis points, or 18% of the average loan premium. Holding the length of the relationship constant, receiving 10 additional loans lowers the estimated loan premium by 4.5 basis points, or 12% of the average premium. The results suggest that the duration effect is marginally larger than the intensity effect, but both are relatively large.
The control variables generally enter with the expected signs. Loans payable outside the region paid smaller premia, reflecting several potential influences, including the implicit collateral carried by bills of exchange and the incremental benefit to a country banker of holding additional funds in a financial center. The latter may have dominated because many city correspondents paid interest on interbank deposits. Fewer bills were drawn on Boston than elsewhere, and the average Boston bill paid the lowest premium, perhaps reflecting the larger incremental benefit of holding additional funds there. Third-party guarantees increased the loan premium nonlinearly, implying that riskier borrowers paid higher rates even after providing more guarantors. Having one guarantor increased the loan premium by 13.9 basis points [20*(ln(2) Ϫ ln(1))]; the incremental effect of a second guarantor was an increase of 8.1 basis points. Loans extended in the second and third quarters paid positive and large loan premia, averaging between 200 and 250 basis points. Some part of the higher average loan premium reflects risk and is consistent with the 19th-century bankers' adage that "June loans and June-bugs are no good" because summer loans often financed more speculative activities. But the large seasonal loan premia mostly reflect a marked decline in the prime rate in spring and summer. Bank rates were more stable and exhibited less pronounced seasonal movements.
Due to the presence of several outliers, two alternative specifications are reported. Column (4) reports estimates using robust regression techniques, which underweights large outliers. Robust regression first estimates the model using OLS, calculates Cook's D-statistic, and excludes any observation where D Ͼ 1.
1 Robust regression then reruns the regression with the excluded observations, calculates weights based on the absolute residuals, and regresses again using those weights. Iterations cease when the change in weights drops below 0.01. Column (4) reports the regression with both relationship variables included.
2 Parameter estimates on the duration and intensity variables are imprecise and quantitatively smaller than in the standard OLS regressions and generally accord with results in Column (3), which suggests that the duration effect outweighs the intensity effect.
Finally, Column (5) reports the results of OLS regression using a truncated sample that excludes the bottom 10% and top 10% of repeat borrowers. Parameter estimates for the control variables from the truncated sample are in line with estimates from the full sample. Coefficients on the relationship variables are estimated imprecisely and are smaller than earlier OLS estimates. 3 The interesting result from the truncated sample is that the intensity effect dominates the duration effect and is, indeed, somewhat larger in magnitude than is the estimate generated by the full sample results in Column (3) . That the intensity effect dominates after eliminating the least and the most frequent borrowers from the sample (mostly borrowers with no prior loans and any borrower who had received between 130 and 250 previous loans) suggests that repeat borrowing provided the banker with useful information.
The evidence is broadly consistent with the hypothesis that extended relationships, both intensive ones and durable ones, are valuable to banks and their borrowers. Even though collinearity generates imprecise results in some specifications, coefficient estimates imply that loan rates decline as relationships evolve. These results accord with Berger and Udell's (1995) findings but not with those of several others. Unfortunately, there is no way to determine if these results are consistent with previous results because most previous studies included measures of both firm age and relationship duration and find that duration has little independent effect after controlling for age. Because we lack evidence on firm age separate from the duration measure, it is impossible to draw direct comparisons to existing studies. Nonetheless, the results are valuable because they emphasize that relationships operate along more dimensions than previously discussed. Long relationships are valuable, but so too are intensive ones.
Relationships and Personal Guarantees
This section empirically investigates the connection between firm-bank relationships and the use of personal guarantees. Because guarantee data is count data (e.g., 0, 1, 2, 3, … separate guarantors), the most appropriate empirical technique is Poisson regression. Poisson regression is specifically designed for use with count data in which observed outcomes assume nonnegative integer values. It is commonly used to study such things as the number of telephone connections to wrong numbers under varying conditions, disease incidence per year, or automobile accidents per day. The procedure has been used by economists in studies of entry (Bodenhorn 1993) and patents (Hausman, Hall, and Griliches 1984) . A study of guarantee usage represents an important extension of Avery, Bostic, and Samolyk (1998) , who find that a majority of small firms carry personal guarantees but had no information on firm-bank relationships. Similarly, Berger and Udell's (1998) survey offers few insights into guarantee usage owing to the lack of prior studies. This section adds to the literature by discussing the impact of relationships on guarantee usage.
For all loans in the sample, we know the number of guarantors to each loan, but know nothing about their occupation, wealth, or connection to the borrowing firm. One loan was excluded because the loan records listed "collateral" in the guarantor column without identifying what that collateral was. Table 3 reports the results of three Poisson specifications. Two distinct relationship variables are again included in the regressions, LNTIMES and LNMONTHS. Controls for place of payment, which captures any offsetting effects collateral may have on guarantee usage, loan size, loan maturity, seasonal effects, and renegotiated or renewed loans, are also included. Just as above, we have no firm-specific information. But it remains likely that the loan size, loan maturity, and place of payment variables capture unobserved industry heterogeneity.
Parameter estimates in Column (1) show that firms that borrowed more frequently provided significantly fewer third-party personal guarantees. Column (2) reports incidence rate ratios (IRRs), which facilitate the economic interpretation of the results. The 0.96 IRR for the LNTIMES variable implies that a firm with a one unit increase in the (log) number of prior loans offered 0.96 times as many (or 4% fewer) guarantors as a firm with a mean (log) number of prior borrowings. The results in Column (3), using LNMONTHS as the relationship measure, are similar. Relationships of longer duration are associated with significantly lower use of guarantees. The 0.98 IRR implies that a unit increase in the (log) number of months of firmbank interactions led to 0.98 times as many (or 2% fewer) guarantors as a firm with a mean (log) relationship length. Unlike most of the credit cost regressions, relationship duration had a smaller impact than intensity on guarantee usage did. Both relationships variables are included in Column (5). The parameter estimates change very little, and despite the potentially imprecise estimates, the intensity variable remains statistically significant and economically meaningful. After controlling for the length of the relationship, a one unit increase in the number of previous loans reduces the number of guarantors by about 6%, a stronger effect than that found when the regression included only the intensity variable. After controlling for intensity, the duration effect has a small and insignificantly positive effect on the number of guarantors.
Collateral and guarantees mitigate postcontractual opportunism and other information problems. Where collateral resolves adverse selection problems when the borrower has more information about project quality than the lender does, third-party guarantees resolve problems when outsiders other than the banker are in a better position to judge the general risk attitudes of the borrower or the specific risk attributes of the contemplated project. Collateral too is also viewed as a means of attenuating moral hazard and effort problems. Third-party guarantees may be superior to collateral in certain circumstances. Unlike collateral, which provides the lender with recourse against specific assets, third-party guarantees represent a generalized claim against the totality of the guarantors' estates. Such generalized claims are effective when the guarantor's disutility of losing assets is great. Generalized claims are called for when the firm's principal asset is the entrepreneur's human capital. Moreover, collateral requires lender monitoring to ensure that the borrower is not dissipating the firm's assets. Third-party guarantees elicit outside monitoring and reduce interim lending costs and risks. Thus, guarantees secured by modest amounts of personal wealth may benefit the lender even if the guarantors' personal assets represent only a small fraction of the value of the loan (Berger and Udell 1998, p. 639) .
The regression results, in fact, suggest that the Black River Bank viewed guarantees as distinct from yet complementary to specific collateral. The bank demanded significantly more guarantors on bills of exchange that typically carried an implicit collateral covenant. Incidence rates reported in Table 3 show that borrowers offered between 1.16 and 1.20 times the number of guarantors for loans payable in New York City, after controlling for relationship intensity. Similarly, borrowers offered between 1.11 and 1.14 times as many guarantors for loans payable in Albany and between 1.09 and 1.14 times the number of guarantors for loans payable in Boston. Despite greater collateral security on bills of exchange, the bank may have asked for more consignors because of slow communications between New York City and northern New York State (about two to three days in the mid-1850s). Possibilities of fraud or asset dissipation surely represented a concern for a banker unable to monitor effectively from a distance. By offering additional guarantors, the borrower mitigated the bank's risk exposure.
This discussion of the simultaneous use of collateral and third-party guarantees adds a new dimension to the existing debate on the consequences of relationship banking. Avery, Bostic, and Samolyk (1998) find that guarantee use declines with firm age, but they fail to illuminate any possible relationship effects. An important line of future research is to deepen our understanding of the consequences of guarantees, especially third-party guarantees, on bank lending behavior.
Relationships and Financial Crises
The records of the Black River Bank provide us with data to conduct a test of the hypothesis that a bank was more willing to renegotiate with long-time customers than with relative newcomers. A sharp financial panic erupted in the autumn of 1857. Triggered by the declining railroad profits and the collapse of the Ohio Life and Trust Company, the panic radiated out from New York City (Calomiris and Schweikart 1991) . Scores of banks failed, nearly all others declared a payments holiday, refusing to redeem their banknotes or deposits in specie. A liquidity scramble developed, and business failures increased dramatically as banks refused to renegotiate or renew existing loans or extend new ones. Small businesses were particularly hard hit. Those fortunate enough to obtain arm's-length credit in commercial paper markets paid exorbitant rates. Commercial paper rates in New York City, which averaged 8.5% per annum in the first eight months of 1857, peaked at 36% on 14 October (New York Tribune 1857). The panic subsided quickly. By January 1858, commercial paper rates fell to 7%; by April they were just 4%.
Although the panic drove up open market lending rates only briefly, the records of the Black River Bank indicate that its consequences lingered in the hinterland. In late 1857 and through 1858, the bank's lending practices changed markedly. Compared with the previous three years, the number of loans fell by nearly 80%, the number of different borrowers fell by nearly 75%, the mean loan amount fell by 25%, and the mean loan rate declined by 17 basis points. The last counterintuitive result came about because the proportion of high-grade borrowers increased. The least desirable borrowers were rationed out. One of the most notable changes, however, was the marked increase in the number of renegotiated loans. In 1855 the bank renewed just 3.5% of its outstanding loans. In the last four months of 1857, the bank renewed 10.2% of its loans, and in 1858, it renewed 16.9% of them. Thus, the data provide a remarkable natural experiment on relationships and loan renegotiation during a financial panic.
To test the hypothesis, information was gathered on 519 loans maturing between 26 August 1857, when commercial paper rates jumped sharply, reflecting initial financial market pressure, and 29 December 1857, when commercial paper rates returned to pre-panic levels. In addition to the same types of data gathered for the 1855 sample (e.g., loan maturity, loan size, place of payment, and guarantors), any loan renegotiated during the panic was linked to the original loan. The sample of 519 loans, then, consists of 40 renegotiated loans definitively linked to the original loan, and 479 nonrenewals. Twelve renegotiated loans could not be definitively linked and were dropped.
The empirical analysis runs headlong into the problem of distinguishing between supply and demand effects because no information exists on rejected renewal applications. While some firms with loans maturing during the panic may not have applied for a renewal, contemporary observers describe a classic liquidity scramble in which most borrowers sought to extend or alter existing loan agreements even while most banks refused to renegotiate (Gibbons 1859) . The following analysis assumes that borrowers not receiving renewals were effectively credit rationed. Nevertheless, the small proportion of observed successes and the possibility that some renegotiated loans were recorded as new rather than renewals biases the empirical analysis against finding significant relationship effects. Table 4 reports the results of three probit specifications. Loans renegotiated during the credit crunch take a value of 1; all others were coded with zeroes. As expected with a small proportion of successes and the likelihood that the bank's decisionmaking procedures changed markedly during a financial crisis, there are few significant parameter coefficients. The regressions provide mixed relationship results. In Column (1), LNTIMES takes the expected positive sign but is small and insignificant. In Column (2), however, the LNMONTHS variable enters positively and significantly. Column (3) includes both relationship variables, and the results reinforce Notes: Dependent variable is dichotomous and equal to 1 if bank renewed/renegotiated a loan maturing during the financial panic in the autumn of 1857. Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of z statistics. *** implies significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. There are 519 observations in all regressions. Source: Black River Bank Records, Discount Books 2 and 3. the conclusion that relationship duration matters more than intensity does during a financial panic. This finding may reflect the significant benefit accruing to firms that develop lasting bank relationships, namely, that they avoid the worse effects of credit rationing during a financial crisis. The duration variable is likely capturing the combined effects of information production over the course of a relationship and firm longevity or survival. Long-lived firms and long-term borrowers are more likely to have proved themselves capable of weathering short-term macroeconomic fluctuations. The maturity variable (LNMATURE) is the other important variable that enters all three specifications significantly, which lends support to the hypothesis that banks screen with private information. If monitoring is most effective when conducted at short and regular intervals in that it offers borrowers fewer opportunities to dissipate assets, the bank's willingness to renegotiate with borrowers with longer loan maturities suggests that the bank already viewed these as lower-risk borrowers.
These results are consistent with theoretical predictions, as well as the empirical evidence of Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) , wherein debt-deflation problems in the banking sector manifest themselves in real sector slowdowns. As borrower balance sheets deteriorate during a credit crunch, banks further restrict lending, which places those firms most reliant on bank credit directly in harm's way. A long-term relationship with a bank mutes the negative consequences of shortterm liquidity constraints. Because banks have superior information on long-time customers, they renegotiate more readily with these customers when their projects are ultimately profitable, but are, like banks, liquidity constrained. Long-term relationships thus rationalize credit allocation during financial crises and credit crunches.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides empirical tests of the hypothesis that long-term relationships between banks and borrowers are valuable. The evidence indicates that small firms excluded from arm's-length markets find it advantageous to form extensive and durable relationships with banks. Repeat borrowing over long periods leads to lower interest costs, lower guarantee usage, and a greater likelihood of maintaining a bank relationship during financial panics and other macroeconomic downturns. In most cases, these effects are statistically significant and economically meaningful.
The results are consistent with the theoretical finance literature, which argues that reputation effects are important in both arm's-length and bank-based loan transactions. Lenders accumulate information over the life of the borrowing relationship and refine loan terms as conditions change and as new information arrives. Such relationship effects are important because small firms are heavily reliant on bank financing and because small firms are more informationally opaque than are large firms with publicly observable reputations.
Although the findings reported here are generally consistent with the hypothesis that banking relationships are valuable to both the banker and the borrower, this research, like most other empirical research, is silent about the precise nature of these benefits and from whence they spring. While the evidence suggests that banks produce and use proprietary information about their customers over time, little is known about how the information is produced, exactly what information is produced, and how that information is used once it is produced. Future research, particularly microlevel research, should address these issues.
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